Abstract-Distributed wireless networks often employ voting to perform critical network functions such as fault-tolerant data fusion, cooperative sensing, and reaching consensus. Voting is implemented by sending messages to a fusion center or via direct message exchange between participants. However, the delay overhead of message-based voting can be prohibitive when numerous participants have to share the wireless channel in sequence, making it impractical for time-critical applications. In this paper, we propose a fast PHYlayer voting scheme called PHYVOS, which significantly reduces the delay for collecting and tallying votes. In PHYVOS, wireless devices transmit their votes simultaneously by exploiting the subcarrier orthogonality of OFDM and without explicit messaging. Votes are realized by injecting energy to pre-assigned subcarriers. We show that PHYVOS is secure against adversaries that attempt to manipulate the voting outcome. Security is achieved without employing cryptography-based authentication and message integrity schemes. We analytically evaluate the voting robustness as a function of PHY-layer parameters. We extend PHYVOS to operate in ad hoc groups, without the assistance of a fusion center. We discuss practical implementation challenges related to multi-device frequency and time synchronization and present a prototype implementation of PHYVOS on the USRP platform. We complement the implementation with larger scale simulations.
D
ISTRIBUTED wireless networks fundamentally rely on the principle of cooperation. Nodes often share information to coordinate network functions and improve the fault-tolerance of distributed operations. As an example, cooperative spectrum sensing is known to improve the detection of licensed user activity in dynamic spectrum access (DSA) [1] . Data fusion is also widely used in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) for improving the performance of target detection, target tracking, and distributed sensing [2] .
For many cooperative functions, binary voting algorithms increase fault-tolerance at relative low cooperation overhead. In binary voting, a community of distributed entities shares binary decisions ("yes" or "no") on a parameter of interest (e.g., channel state, presence of a target). A combining decision rule is applied to collectively determine the decision outcome. This rule is based on some form of majority voting, plurality or threshold, to achieve the desired level of reliability. Typically, binary votes are casted using a messaging scheme, in which 1-bit votes are carried by individual messages. However, message-based voting incurs relatively high voting delay. In this work, we define the voting delay as the time period between the initiation of the voting process with the transmission of the first vote by any of the participants, until all votes have been received at the tallier. The tallying time is not accounted as part of the voting delay. For message-based voting, each 1-bit vote is carried by a packet that contains PHY layer and a MAC layer headers.
Moreover, verifying the voter authenticity and protecting the integrity of binary votes via digital signatures and message authentication codes, requires additional packet fields. All additional fields (headers, message authentication codes, digital signature) increase the overall transmission time per vote. Further, voters must sequentially access the shared wireless channel to cast their votes. Most popular channel access protocols include anti-collision mechanisms (e.g., backoff process) that further increase the voting delay to cast multiple votes. For time-critical applications, a high voting delay could be unacceptable [8] , [11] .
As an example, consider the cooperative spectrum sensing mechanism proposed for DSA networks [1] . To accurately determine spectrum opportunities, secondary users sense licensed channels and submit state information ("busy" or "idle") to a fusion center (FC). The FC applies a combining decision rule (e.g., majority voting) to reliably determine the state of each channel. Existing federal regulations mandate that channel sensing must occur every two seconds [11] , which leads to the frequent repetition of the fusion process. At such frequency, the time delay of message-based voting becomes problematic as the number of participants increases. Similar time and scalability constraints are encountered in control applications of networked multi-agent systems, where the consensus time requirement could be even more stringent [8] .
To address the poor delay scalability of message-based voting, we present a secure and fast voting scheme called PHY-VOS that implements voting at the PHY layer. The basic principle of PHYVOS is shown in Fig. 1 . Wireless devices exploit the subcarrier orthogonality in the widely adopted orthogonal frequency division modulation (OFDM), to simultaneously cast their votes to an FC within just a few symbols. PHYVOS yields two distinct advantages relative to message-based voting. First, participants do not have to sequentially access the shared channel to cast their votes. This feature leads to significant delay savings, as delays due to contention and sequential access are eliminated. Second, votes do not carry long headers and cryptographic signatures that prolong the message transmission time. Therefore, PHYVOS drastically reduces the delay of voting, while maintaining a high security level. Implementing secure voting at the PHY layer involves new security and implementation challenges.
Voting at the PHY layer is susceptible to false vote insertion and vote modification attacks, similar to message-based voting. An adversary can alter the voting outcome by exploiting the open nature of the wireless medium and manipulating the transmitted signals at the PHY layer. Without access to cryptographic primitives such as digital signatures and message authentication codes, securing the voting process is particularly challenging. The superposition of simultaneous transmissions from spatially-separated senders (voters) to a combined OFDM signal requires intricate transmitter and receiver designs [9] , [27] . Senders must be synchronized in frequency and time to achieve symbol alignment at the receiver. Maintaining accurate synchronization in distributed systems could incur prohibitive coordination overheads [27] . Our Contributions. We design PHYVOS, a PHY-layer voting scheme that reduces the voting delay by several orders of magnitude compared to message-based voting. In PHY-VOS, the voting delay, defined as the time required to cast votes, is reduced by exploiting the subcarrier orthogonality of OFDM to simultaneously cast votes from multiple participants. Vote tallying is performed at an FC that receives multiple votes as a single OFDM symbol. We further present a fully distributed version that allows every participant compute the vote tally, without the assistance of an FC. To overcome the challenges related to decoding simultaneous transmissions from multiple senders, binary votes are casted by adding energy to designated subcarriers. No transmission of preambles and headers is required, as the receiver does not demodulate the OFDM signal. Simple energy detection suffices. Moreover, relying on energy detection rather than message decodability for vote casting strengthens the security of our scheme, as it is generally hard to "erase" energy from a channel [10] , [24] .
We study the robustness of PHYVOS against an external and an internal adversary. The former attempts to modify votes by inserting energy into various subcarriers without knowing the subcarrier allocation. The latter is aware of any group secrets used to assign subcarriers, but not of pairwise secrets. PHYVOS guarantees the integrity of the voting outcome. We show that an active adversary who attempts to modify the casted votes, cannot flip the voting outcome at the FC with overwhelming probability. Also, the adversary cannot inject additional votes at the FC. We improve voting robustness by incorporating the transmission of multiple OFDM symbols to cast a single vote, thus realizing a repetition code. Since OFDM symbols have very short duration, a repetition code is still far more efficient than messaging. We analytically evaluate the voting robustness as a function of the relevant system parameters under a secret and an open vote model. We discuss practical implementation challenges of PHYVOS related to frequency and time synchronization. We present a prototype implementation of PHYVOS on the NI USRP platform. We complement the implementation with larger scale simulations and demonstrate the PHYVOS robustness to external and internal attacks.
PHYVOS is compatible with any wireless standard that is based on OFDM. This includes 802.11a/g/n/ac, WiMAX, UWB, DVB, and others. PHYVOS requires no hardware modifications of the OFDM TX/RX circuitry. Participants cast votes by transmitting regular OFDM symbols, and the RX can decipher votes at the FFT module of the OFDM receiver.
Paper Organization. In Section 2, we present the system, communication, and adversary models. Section 3 describes PHYVOS.
In Section 4, we analyze the security of PHYVOS under internal and external adversaries. A fully distributed version of PHYVOS without an FC is presented in Section 5. In Section, 6, we compare the overhead of PHYVOS with the overhead of message-based voting. Practical considerations and experimental verification of PHYVOS' performance are presented in Section 7. In Section 8, we discuss related work and conclude in Section 9. Table 1 summarizes the most frequently used notation.
NOTATION AND MODELS

Notation Summary
Entities
The following entities are involved in the voting process:
The administrator ðAÞ is responsible for initializing the participants and the tallier with relevant cryptographic quantities, after verifying their identities. The M participants u 1 ; u 2 ; . . . ; u M cast M votes v 1 ; v 2 ; . . . ; v M to the tallier. Each vote reflects a binary choice. The tallier ðRÞ is responsible for verifying and tallying the votes of all the participants by computing the voting outcome ðT Þ. The adversary attempts to alter the voting outcome by injecting his own signals during the voting process. In most applications, A and R could be the same entity such as the fusion center shown in Fig. 1. 
Voting Model
During the voting process, M participants cast M votes v 1 ; v 2 ; . . . ; v M to the tallier. For ease of illustration, we analyze the case where binary votes are casted, i.e., v i 2 f0; 1g; 8i. The tallier R computes the voting outcome according to a threshold decision rule
The value of g is application-dependent. As an example, by setting g ¼ 0, a plurality rule is implemented. Other values of g allow for more relaxed or stricter agreement. The voting process must satisfy the requirements of correctness and robustness defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Correctness). In the absence of attacks, all votes must be unambiguously recorded and tallied. That is, the voting must be error-free.
Definition 2 (Robustness).
A voting scheme is said to be robust against active attacks and faults, if the estimated outcomeT at the tallier equals the true outcome T computed by tallying the vote intend of all participants.
Robustness is a weaker requirement than accuracy, because it can be satisfied even if some votes are incorrectly tallied. However, robustness is sufficient for the intended applications of PHY-layer voting. We emphasize that other well-known voting requirements such as receipt-freeness [29] , are beyond the scope of the envisioned applications of PHY-layer voting.
Communication Model
We consider a one-hop communication topology, where every participant is either within the communication range of the tallier (star topology), or within one hop of each other (complete graph). Therefore votes are directly casted without a relay. Participants cast their votes to the tallier using an OFDM system with N orthogonal subcarriers, denoted by f 1 ; f 2 ; . . . f N . Participants could be at varying distances from the tallier. Moreover, participants and the tallier are synchronized to a time-slotted system with a maximum synchronization error of Dt; which depends on clock drifts and multipath. Note that time synchronization is already required for other network functions such as media access control.
Each participant must meet a minimum SNR requirement to cast a vote. This assumption is also true for message-based voting, where a sufficiently high SNR must be achieved to perform error-free decoding. As our method relies on energy detection, no other requirements are placed on the channel model. Different channels (e.g., AWGN, Rayleigh, Rician) could model the participant-to-tallier communications. If a participant's channel has an SNR below the required threshold for vote detection due to destructive interference, for all practical purposes this participant is no longer part of the voting. Finally, the channel state is assumed to be difficult to predict without being very close (within a few wavelengths) of the receiver, and without the transmission of preambles. This is true for most multipath scenarios, as it has been demonstrated by several works (e.g., [10] , [12] , [19] , [24] ).
Adversary Model
The adversary aims at flipping the voting outcomeT computed at the tallier. The adversary could be external or internal. An external adversary is unaware of any cryptographic primitives used to initialize participants. An internal adversary on the other hand, is a legitimate participant with access to any group secrets. We assume that the adversary does not launch denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that prevent the computation of any voting outcome (e.g., by eliminating the votes of every participant). Such an attack is easily detectable. The adversary is loosely synchronized to the tallier with the same synchronization error as the rest of the participants. Two different voting models are considered with respect to the secrecy of the vote intent of each participant:
Secret Vote Model: In the secret vote model, the adversary is not aware of the vote intent of the participants.
Open Vote Model: In this model, the adversary is aware of the vote intent of the targeted participants. The vote intent can be determined by some side-channel information. For instance, in a spectrum sensing application for CRNs, the vote intent of an honest participant can be determined by performing spectrum sensing on a nearby location.
PHYVOS: PHYSICAL LAYER VOTING
The key principle of PHYVOS is to simultaneously cast votes by injecting energy on designated subcarriers. An adversary attempting to modify a vote on subcarrier f i , would have to "erase" the signal received by the tallier on f i and simultaneously inject energy on some other subcarrier. This is generally a hard problem that requires knowledge of the signal transmitted at f i , the precise time that the signal was transmitted, the signal propagation delay, and precise channel state information [7] , [10] , [24] . This knowledge needs to be collected and synchronized for all voters. PHYVOS consists of four phases: the setup phase, the vote request phase, the vote casting phase, and the tallying phase.
Setup Phase
In the setup phase, the administrator initializes the tallier and the M participants. If the tallier and the administrator are the same entity, only the M participants need to be initialized. The initialization process is as follows.
Key Generation. The administrator A executes a probabilistic key generator algorithm KeyGenð1 t Þ ! K. This algorithm takes as input a security parameter t, and outputs a master key K. A derives M þ 1 additional keys from K with K perm ¼ H perm ðKÞ and K vote;i ¼ H vote ðK; iÞ for i ¼ ½1::M, where H perm and H vote are cryptographic hash functions.
Key Assignment. A loads K perm and K vote;i with i 2 ½1::M to R. It also loads K perm and K vote;i to each u i . At the end of the setup phase, R shares one pairwise key K vote;i with each u i and a common key K perm with all u i s.
Vote Request Phase
In the vote request phase, the tallier synchronizes all participants for simultaneous voting. This phase is necessary to ensure that delay overhead gains are achieved by the simultaneous vote casting. Periodic or on-demand voting can be employed to request a vote. In periodic voting, participants exploit their synchronization to a common time-slotted system to cast their votes at fixed time intervals without an explicit request from the tallier. This operation mode is suitable for periodic network operations. In on-demand voting, the tallier broadcasts a vote request synchronization message to all participants to initiate the voting process. ðnÞ. One subcarrier is used to cast a "no" vote whereas the other is used to cast a "yes" vote. We note that in the absence of an adversary, a single subcarrier is sufficient to cast a binary vote. However, the adversary could easily modify the vote that corresponds to energy absence by injecting energy on the alternative subcarrier. Therefore, we adopt a two-subcarrier solution.
Moreover, the subcarriers assigned to each participant are permuted per time slot to hide the assignment from the adversary. This is achieved by applying a pseudo-random permutation on the subcarrier assignment. Finally, for a given assignment f ðnÞ to participant u i , the mapping to "yes" and "no" votes is randomized by the application of a pseudo-random binary sequence shared between u i and R. This prevents an internal adversary from determining the subcarrier that corresponds to a specific vote. Formally, vote casting involves the following steps:
(1) Subcarrier assignment: Each participant u i applies pseudo-random function
to map subcarrier with index p during slot n, to subcarrier P F ðK perm ; p; nÞ. 
where a y is a randomly selected modulation symbol and n 0 n < n 0 þ '. Note that the placement of energy of either f
ðnÞ is based on the XOR between the vote value v i ðnÞ and the random bit r i ðnÞ. The vote casting phase for three participants and six subcarriers is shown in Fig. 2 . In Step 1, participants apply the pseudo-random permutation to obtain the subcarrier assignment. For the first four time slots, the subcarrier permutations are ff 6 ; f 2 ; f 3 ; f 4 ; f 1 ; f 5 g, ff 1 ; f 3 ; f 5 ; f 6 ; f 4 ; f 2 g, ff 3 ; f 1 ; f 6 ; f 2 ; f 5 ; f 4 g and ff 5 ; f 4 ; f 2 ; f 1 ; f 6 ; f 3 g. Participant u 1 is assigned ff
; f 2 Þ; ðf 1 ; f 3 Þ; ðf 3 ; f 1 Þ; ðf 5 ; f 4 Þg, participant u 2 is assigned fðf 3 ; f 4 Þ; ðf 5 ; f 6 Þ; ðf 6 ; f 2 Þ; ðf 2 ; f 1 Þg and participant u 3 is assigned fðf 1 ; f 5 Þ; ðf 4 ; f 2 Þ; ðf 5 ; f 4 Þ; ðf 6 ; f 3 Þg. In Step 2, each participant u i generates the pseudo-random sequence for slots 1 À 4. For u 1 , r 1 ¼ f0; 1; 1; 0g; for u 2 , r 2 ¼ f0; 0; 1; 1g;, and for for u 3 , r 3 ¼ f1; 0; 1; 0g;. In Step 3, participants cast votes at the designated subcarriers. In our example, u 1 wants to cast a "yes" vote ðv 1 ¼ 1Þ. He XORs v 1 with r 1 and determines the active subcarriers as ff 2 ; f 1 ; f 3 ; f 4 g for slots 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. The active subcarriers for other participants are similarly determined. The symbol votes arrive (almost) time aligned at the tallier such that OFDM symbols are formed as shown in Fig. 2 .
Vote Tallying Phase
In the vote tallying phase, the tallier computes the voting outcome T according to the threshold rule in (1). To infer the votes of each participant, the tallier computes the FFT of the digitized baseband OFDM signal to separate the spectral components to each of the subcarriers. The tallier then uses an energy detector at each output of the FFT block to detect the transmitted symbol votes. Note here that no symbol demodulation is necessary to determine the presence of energy. At time n, a symbol vote v i ðnÞ is computed only if the detected average power is beyond a threshold g D on only one of the two designated subcarriers. In any other case, the symbol vote is recorded in error. Formally, for a participant u i , the recovery of v i at the tallier is performed as follows. ðnÞ assigned to u i and compute the average received power over L samples 
with n 0 n < n 0 þ ': (2) Extract symbol votes: The symbol votesv i ðnÞ are computed by XORing the subcarrier superscript were energy was detected with the pseudo-random sequence shared between u i and the tallier to correctly map the subcarrier index to the vote valuê
with n 0 n < n 0 þ ': (3) Compute the final vote: The final votev i is computed by discarding all inconclusive symbol voteŝ
e; otherwise:
(4) Compute the final voting outcome: The final voting outcomeT computed according tô
The voting outcomeT is estimated by tallying all votes using Eq. (1), where the vote values v i have been substituted by their estimatesv i ; i 2 ½1::M. The tallying operation is shown in the example of Fig. 2 . For participant u 1 , the tallier detects an average power over g D on subcarriers ff 2 ; f 1 ; f 3 ; f 4 g. By XORing the output f1; 0; 0; 1g with the random sequence R 1 ¼ f0; 1; 1; 0g, it obtains the symbol voteŝ
The vote computation proceeds in parallel for all participants. The voting outcome is estimated to beT ¼ 1.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the robustness of PHYVOS under the external and internal adversary model.
External Adversary
Under the external adversary model, the adversary is unaware of the cryptographic keys K perm and K vote;i used to permute the subcarrier assignment per time slot and also randomize the symbol votes. Therefore, his best strategy is to inject energy on randomly selected subcarriers. Let us consider the vote v i of u i , consisting of ' symbol votes v i ðn 0 Þ; v i ðn 0 þ 1Þ; . . . ; v i ðn 0 þ ' À 1Þ;. To successfully cast v i , the adversary must guess the subcarrier of u i that dictates the vote opposite to v i for ' symbol votes. Even if the subcarrier is correctly guessed, the adversary cannot "erase" the energy injected by the legitimate participant on the complementary subcarrier. Erasure of the modulation symbol a y transmitted by u i requires the a priori knowledge of a y , knowledge of the channel between the voter and the tallier as well as the adversary and the tallier, and precise synchronization between the voter and the adversary [7] . We note that u i randomly selects a y for each symbol vote. Moreover, the channel between u i and tallier rapidly decorrelates with the distance from u i . Unless the adversary is very close to u i , the channel between u i and tallier is unpredictable [21] .
Without the opportunity to flip votes, the adversary can flip the voting outcome if he nullifies a sufficient number of in favor votes to overcome the decision threshold g. Vote nullification occurs, if energy is present on both subcarriers assigned to a participants over the ' symbol votes. Let the adversary inject energy on J N subcarriers of his choice in order to flip the voting outcome T . Without loss of generality assume that votes in favor of T outnumber the votes against T by a voting margin m. The probability of flipping the outcome to an estimateT 6 ¼ T is given in Proposition 1. Proposition 1. Let participants cast M votes over 2M N subcarriers by transmitting ' symbol votes. Let an external adversary inject energy on J N subcarriers. The probability of flipping the voting outcome is
where n 1 ¼ Mþm 2 denotes the number of votes in favor of T and Selecting the Security Parameter '. Proposition 1 allows us to select the number of symbol votes ' to guarantee robustness with a desired probability p 0 . The following corollary yields a lower bound on ' such that Pr½T 6 ¼ T p 0 .
where
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix B, available in the online supplemental material. t u
From Corollary 1, we observe that the required number of symbol votes ' drops linearly with the logarithm of p 0 . This is also confirmed by Fig. 3a , which shows ' as a function of p 0 , for a total for 20 participants voting over 52 subcarriers. In Fig. 3a , we set J ¼ 12, g ¼ 0 (plurality rule) and varied the vote margin m. We observe that a relatively small number of symbol votes (' < 5) allows us to achieve high levels of robustness for relatively small margins.
An obvious tactic for the adversary is to increase the number of attacked subcarriers. In Fig. 3b , we show the number of symbol votes required to achieve a desired robustness level for various J, when the vote margin is fixed to m ¼ 4. We observe that if small number of subcarriers are attacked, the achieved robustness is high for small '. The adversary's success increases with J at the expense of increased presence over the various subcarriers.
To prevent the adversary from flipping the voting outcome via vote nullification, the tallier can reject the voting outcome if the fraction of nullified votes exceeds a certain threshold. This threshold can be defined to exceed the expected number of nullified votes under unintentional interference. In Section 7, we explore this prevention method by determining the pmf for the number of nullified votes due to the imperfections of the wireless channel. The pmf is used to select the threshold for rejecting the voting outcome.
Internal Adversary
An internal adversary could be any malicious participant aiming at manipulating the voting outcome. Such an adversary has knowledge of the key K perm used for the subcarrier assignment. Therefore, it can target particular subcarriers to nullify votes of certain participants. Note that we do not consider the case where the adversary compromises the credentials (pairwise keys) of several participants by, for example, gaining access to the participants' devices. In this case, the adversary can impersonate the compromised participants and cast votes on their behalf. For all practical purposes, such impersonations cannot be authenticated using cryptographic methods, and can only be detected using radio fingerprinting methods. Such attacks are possible against message-based voting systems as well, and cannot be defended by standard cryptographic methods of authentication and message integrity.
Modifying a Single Vote. We first analyze the modification of vote v i of a targeted participant u i . Let u i initiate its voting at time slot n 0 by submitting ' symbol votes. Although the adversary is aware of the subcarriers assigned to u i , he is unaware of the pseudo-random sequences used to map the subcarriers to the "yes/no" votes. Without access to the pairwise key K vote;i , the adversary can at best guess the subcarrier where energy must be injected to emulate a "yes" or a "no" vote. We consider two possible adversary strategies. In the first strategy, the adversary randomly selects one of u i 's subcarriers to emulate a target vote. In the second strategy, the adversary nullifies vote v i by injecting energy on both subcarriers assigned to u i .
Strategy 1: In the first strategy, the adversary A emulates the voter behavior by injecting energy to either f
Let A target the casting of v i ¼ 0. To successfully cast v i , he can guess the subcarrier mapping with success probability 0.5, for every symbol vote. The adversary can still hope to nullify the vote of u i (i.e., change the value ofv i ðnÞ from v i ðnÞ ¼ v i tov i ðnÞ ¼ e). According to (5) , to nullifyvðiÞ, all symbol votesv i ðn 0 Þ;v i ðn 0 þ 1Þ; . . . ;v i ðn þ 0 þ ' À 1Þ must be nullified. This is equivalent to guessing the subcarrier index used by u i to cast each of the ' symbol votes. As the subcarrier carrying each symbol vote is selected pseudo-randomly and independently per symbol vote, the probability of nullifyingv i becomes
Note that Eq. (12) is true even if the value ofv i is known a priori because the index of the subcarrier carryingv i ðnÞ is XORed with r i ðnÞ (see Eq. (2)). From (12), we can select ' to drive Pr½vðiÞ ¼ e to any desired level.
Modifying the Voting Outcome. We now analyze the probability of modifying the voting outcome under the secret vote model and the open vote model stated in Section 2.5. Proposition 2. Let an internal adversary attempt to nullify the votes of d participants and let p ¼ Pr½vðiÞ ¼ e denote the probability of nullifying a singe vote, as given by (12) . Under the secret vote model, an internal adversary following Strategy 1 can flip the voting outcome for a decision threshold g and a margin m with probability
where n 1 ¼ Under the open vote model, an internal adversary following Strategy 1 can flip the voting outcome for a decision threshold g and a margin m with probability
where d denotes the number of votes that the adversary attempts to nullify, with d n 1 .
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix D, available in the online supplemental material. t u Selecting the Security Parameter '. Propositions 2 and 3 allow us to select the number of symbol votes ' to guarantee robustness with a desired probability.
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix E, available in the online supplemental material. t u
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix F, available in the online supplemental material. t u
From Corollaries 2 and 3, we observe that the required number of symbol votes ' drops linearly with the logarithm of p 0 . This is also attested by the plots in Fig. 4 , which show the required ' as a function of p 0 ; for various margins m and number of attacked votes d (to demonstrate the linear relationship of ' with the logarithm of p 0 , the ceiling function has not been applied). In Fig. 4 , a total of 20 participants were considered and the voting threshold g was set to zero (plurality rule). Finally, d was set to the number of positive votes. Fig. 4a considers the secret vote model under Strategy 1. As m increases, fewer symbol votes are necessary to provide the same robustness. However, without knowing the vote intend, the adversary nullifies both "yes" and "no" votes, thus making it harder to close the vote margin. In Fig. 4b , we plot ' as a function of p 0 for different d and for m ¼ 4 under the secret vote model. If few votes are attacked (small d), the achieved robustness is high for relatively small '. When d increases, a larger ' is needed to achieve the same robustness. However, the adversary's gains diminish beyond a certain d. As more "yes" votes are initially corrupted, the number of remaining "yes" and "no" votes is balanced, thus becoming equally likely to nullify votes of both types with the increase of d: Such nullification does not close the voting margin. Fig. 4c considers the open vote model under Strategy 1. Comparing to Fig. 4a , we observe that a higher ' is necessary to provide the same level of robustness when compared to the secret vote model. This is because the adversary only attacks participants that intend to cast votes in favor of T .
Strategy 2:
In the second strategy, the adversary injects energy on both subcarriers assigned to a targeted participant to nullify the participant's vote with certainty. This strategy comes at the expense of increased presence (many subcarriers are attacked). The probability of flipping the voting outcome with Strategy 2 is expressed in Propositions 4 and 5 for the secret and the open vote models, respectively.
Proposition 4.
Under the secret vote model, an internal adversary following Strategy 2 can flip the voting outcome for a decision threshold g and a margin m with probability
when attempting to nullify d votes.
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix G, available in the online supplemental material. Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix H, available in the online supplemental material. t u Fig. 4d shows the probability of flipping the voting outcome as a function of J for various m, under the secret vote model. This probability decreases with m because the adversary must nullify more in favor votes. Moreover, it increases with J. Note that the probability of flipping the voting outcome no longer depends on the security parameter '. This is because the adversary injects energy over both subcarriers assigned to a targeted participants, and therefore nullifies the targeted vote with certainty, irrespective of '.
When Strategy 2 is employed under the open vote model, the voting outcome can be flipped with certainty by attacking a number of votes equal to the vote margin. This is because the energy injection is limited to the subcarriers of participants that intend to cast in favor votes. Nullifying m of those votes is sufficient to close the voting margin.
Subcarrier Sequence Preloading. To cope with an internal adversary following Strategy 2, we design a method for concealing the subcarrier assignment between participants. Without knowledge of the subcarriers assigned to others, an internal adversary becomes equivalent to an external one. He can only blindly inject energy on various subcarriers hoping to nullify in favor votes and flip the voting outcome. To hide the subcarriers used by each participant, we modify the setup and vote casting phases as follows. 
to map subcarrier with index p during slot n, to subcarrier P F ðK perm ; p; nÞ. For each participant, it computes
Vote Casting Phase. The vote casting phase remains the same as in Section 3.3, with the exception of skipping the subcarrier assignment step. By preloading the subcarrier sequence at each participant, an internal adversary u i cannot infer the subcarrier assignment of any other participant. The adversary is only aware of his own sequence F u i . Without access to K perm , the adversary can only select the subcarriers where energy is injected at random. In this case, the robustness of PHYVOS under an internal adversary model becomes equivalent to the robustness of PHYVOS under an external adversary, as it is analyzed in Section 4.1. Note that a formula adjustment is needed in Proposition 1 to account for the reduction in the number of subcarriers unknown to the adversary. Since u i is aware of his own subcarrier assignment, it selects to inject energy to J out of the remaining N À 2 subcarriers (as opposed to J out of N as stated in Proposition 1). Nevertheless, the robustness computation follows along the same lines as in Proposition 1 and therefore, it is omitted.
The subcarrier sequence preloading comes at the expense of extra storage at each participant, which is linear to the number of voting rounds. The storage required to support L voting rounds with ' symbol votes per round is equal to 2dlog 2 Ne'L bits (each voting round consists of ' symbol votes casted in one of the two subcarriers indexed by 2dlog 2 Ne bits). For example, a sequence of 80 Kbytes would support 10 5 voting rounds over 64 subcarriers.
VOTING WITHOUT A CENTRALIZED TALLIER
In this section, we design an implementation of PHYVOS without a centralized tallier. The scenario is depicted in Fig. 5 . A set of six participants co-located within the same collision domain cast their votes. Each participant acts as a tallier by independently tallying the votes casted by other participants and computing the voting outcome. All participants end up with the same voting outcome estimateT . To maintain the parallel nature of our PHY-layer voting technique, participants must be capable of simultaneously cast votes and performing the tallying operation. This entails the simultaneous transmission and reception over the OFDM band, that is the operation of each participant in full duplex (FD) mode. We outline two transceiver solutions that enable this concurrent transmission and reception. The first solution exploits self-interference cancellation (SIC) techniques to enable the FD mode. The second solution explores principles similar to OFDMA to allow for the simultaneous vote casting from multiple participants
Full Duplex OFDM
Recent advances on SIC techniques have shown that it is feasible to transmit and receive over the same frequency band [6] , [28] . This is achieved by suppressing a significant portion of self interference, using a combination of antenna-based SIC, signal inversion, and RF/digital interference cancellation. In these techniques, the transmitted signal is subtracted from the received signal such that the former does not occupy the dynamic range of the ADC, allowing for the decoding of the incoming signal. For OFDM systems, FD can be realized by independently reducing self-interference at each subcarrier using narrowband cancellation techniques [28] , [33] . The operating characteristics of PHYVOS, make the adoption of SIC based FD OFDM easier than its use for the communication of messages. First, each transmitter injects a signal on a single subcarrier, leaving the rest of the subcarriers empty. Thus, the self-interference in other subcarriers is small and primarily limited to the adjacent subcarriers. Applying SIC on the specific subcarrier used to cast a vote further reduces the interference on other subcarriers. Moreover, no signal decoding is necessary. Determination of votes is performed by detecting energy at the output of the FFT block. An imperfect cancellation at subcarrier f 
OFDMA
If participants are not equipped with SIC-capable transceivers, FD operation can be achieved by applying OFDMA. Assuming that the transceivers can concurrently operate their transmission and reception radio chains, they can rely on frequency separation to enable the simultaneous vote transmission and reception. Using the adjacent subcarrier method (ASM) [3] , participants can form subchannels from adjacent subcarriers so that additional frequency separation is created. In particular, each subchannel consists of three adjacent subcarriers. To cast a vote on a subchannel, energy is injected on the middle subcarrier, using the adjacent subcarriers as guards. Although this approach limits the 1. If preloading is not possible, the sequence F u i can be generated by the tallier that stores K perm . The tallier can securely communicate F u i to a participant using K vote;i . spectral efficiency of OFDM by essentially converting it to a FDD system, it still provides significant delay reduction for PHY-layer voting relative to message-based voting.
Decentralized PHYVOS
Similar to the centralized tallier scenario, the decentralized PHYVOS consists of four phases: the setup phase, the vote request phase, the vote casting phase, and the tallying phase.
Setup Phase. In the setup phase, the administrator initializes all M participants by preloading K perm to each participant. Note that the pairwise keys K vote;i used for sharing a pairwise secret random sequence between each voter and the tallier are no longer used. The sequences were applied to each symbol vote to conceal the vote-to-subcarrier mapping from internal adversaries (Step 3 of the vote casting phase). When the tallier is replicated at every participant, all sequences R i must be disclosed to participants, thus negating their security function.
Vote Request Phase. The vote request phase follows the same steps described in Section 3.2.
Vote Casting Phase. In the vote casting phase, participants cast and receive votes simultaneously using FD-OFDM. Each vote v i consists of a series of ' symbol votes. The vote casting steps are as follows:
Subcarrier Assignment: The subcarrier assignment is performed in the same manner as in Section 3.3.
Vote Casting: Let voting casting be initiated at slot n 0 . To cast a vote v i 2 f0; 1g, a participant u i generates ' symbol votes 
Security Analysis
In this section, we briefly sketch the robustness of PHYVOS with a decentralized tallier under an external and internal adversary model. External Adversary. An external adversary is unaware of the cryptographic key K perm used to permute the subcarrier assignment per symbol vote. Therefore, his best strategy is to inject energy on randomly selected subcarriers. Let the adversary inject energy on J subcarriers, as in the case of centralized PHYVOS. Consider the tallying operation occurring at participant u i . By injecting energy on J subcarriers, the adversary can potentially impact any vote but v i , because v i is known to u i a priori. If v i is in favor of the voting outcome T , the adversary has to successfully nullify m À g votes excluding v i in order to flipT . This probability is given by Proposition 1 by adjusting the number of in-favor votes that can be nullified to n 1 ¼ Mþm 2 À 1: If v i is against the voting outcome T , the probability of flipping the voting outcome is given by Proposition 1, without adjusting n 1 .
Internal Adversary. An internal adversary is aware of cryptographic key K perm used by each participant for generating its subcarrier assignment. This allows the adversary to identify the subcarriers used by specific participants to cast votes. Moreover, the subcarrier-to-vote mapping is known because it is no longer randomized by the pairwise secret sequences R i . The application of these sequences is no longer effective because every participant must be aware of them to correctly tally votes. With full knowledge of the subcarrier assignment, flipping the voting outcome can be achieved by nullifying m À g in-favor votes by targeting exactly m À g subcarriers.
Although the tally modification cannot be prevented, it is easily detectable by legitimate participants. In-favor participants can determine that their votes are nullified by detecting energy on the opposite subcarrier from the active one. Moreover, the number of nullified votes received by each participant (tallier) is indicative of an ongoing tally modification. In this case, the voting results can be invalidated.
VOTING OVERHEAD
In this section, we compare the voting delay of PHYVOS with the voting delay of message-based voting. Suppose a popular OFDM-based protocol such as 802.11g is used for messagebased voting (MV). Each 802.11g packet consists of a 20 msec preamble (5 OFDM symbols), a 30-byte MAC header and a 4-byte CRC code. Moreover, the vote integrity is protected by a message authentication code based on a secure hash function such as SHA-256 [30] . The message digest size for SHA-256 is 32 bytes. Assuming the highest possible transmission rate for 802.11g, each OFDM symbol can carry 6 bits per subcarrier, times 48 data subcarriers = 36 bytes. Therefore, one vote can be transmitted in 7 OFDM symbols. Ignoring any contention for capturing the wireless medium, participants must wait at least a DCF interframe space (DIFS) between transmitting messages. For 802.11g, DIFS = 13 OFDM symbols. The total delay required to cast M votes becomes
In PHYVOS, up to 26 participants can simultaneously cast their votes using ' OFDM symbols (for 52 subcarriers and no pilots). For M > 26, a second voting round is required. The value of ' is based on the analysis presented in Section 4. For our comparison, we set ' ¼ 11 symbols, which yields a robustness level of 10 À3 (we note that this is an online attack, without any opportunity for repeated trials. Therefore, a robustness of 10 À3 is acceptable). The total delay required to cast M votes becomes,
Fig . 6 shows the voting delay as a function of the number of participants M, assuming a typical OFDM symbol duration of 4msec. PHYVOS reduces delay by one order of magnitude for M ¼ 11 and two orders of magnitude for M ¼ 50. Note that for M ¼ 26, the MV incurs a delay of at least 2 sec. We note that in most modern OFDM systems the number of available subcarriers could be substantially higher than 52. For instance, the number of subcarriers in LTE exceeds 300 and can reach up to 1,200 when the allocated bandwidth is 20 MHz. Therefore, a much larger number of participants can be simultaneously supported, although we do not anticipate that this number will be large for one-hop scenarios. In the event that multiple rounds are needed to accommodate the number of voting participants, the individual delay until a each participants casts its vote does not affect the voting delay, which is defined as the delay until all votes are casted. If an application requires rectifying the unfairness in the individual voting delay, a round robin approach can be used to alternate between voting groups on every voting round.
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION
Frequency Synchronization
Radio oscillators do not operate at the same nominal frequency due to manufacturing imperfections. This frequency misalignment is known as carrier frequency offset (CFO). OFDM systems are particularly sensitive to CFO due to the subcarrier orthogonality requirement. The CFO has two critical effects on demodulation. First, subcarriers are no longer orthogonal causing inter-carrier interference (ICI) and reducing the SNR. Second, symbols at each subcarrier appear arbitrary rotated in the constellation. Finally, a large CFO can cause a subcarrier shift at the receiver, whereby a symbol transmitted over subcarrier f i is mapped to f j . This shift occurs if the CFO is larger than the subcarrier spacing [25] , [26] .
To mitigate the impact of CFO in practical systems, receivers estimate the CFO using the preamble transmitted with every packet. In PHYVOS, no preamble is present with the transmission of votes to save on messaging overhead. However, the lack of frequency synchronization does not impact the correct vote estimation, because no demodulation is performed. Any symbol rotation in the constellation map does not affect the energy estimation on a given subcarrier. After all, the symbol transmitted to realize a vote is selected at random and does not convey any information. Furthermore, for a CFO that does not cause a subcarrier bin shift, the strongest ICI component comes from adjacent subcarriers. To limit ICI, the subcarriers assigned to each participant can be spaced as far as the number of participants allows. For instance, for 10 voters and 64 subcarriers, every 3rd subcarrier is used to cast a vote.
Time Synchronization
Another practical problem for PHYVOS is that symbol votes do not reach the tallier perfectly synchronized. Differences in propagation delay and device clock drifts can cause a time misalignment between the symbol votes casted by each device. This misalignment will affect the set of samples that fall within the FFT window of the Fourier transform applied at the receiver for extracting the spectral components of the OFDM signal. This is similar to symbol bleeding caused in OFDM systems when delayed copies of OFDM symbols arrive at the receiver due to multipath effects. The solution applied in OFDM is to append a cyclic prefix (CP) to every symbol, which is in the order of 0.8 msec.
For PHYVOS, the time misalignment Dt between symbols at the receiver can be greater than 0.8 msec. For a typical WiFi range of 300m, the propagation delay difference between two devices can by up to 1msec. Moreover, the typical clock error for modern clocks is well below 5ppm [18] . If clock synchronization is performed every 100 msec (typical beacon transmission period for WiFi base stations), the expected clock error between two devices can be up to 1m sec, making the total time misalignment Dt 2msec.
To cope with the symbol misalignment, we can extend the CP duration to 2msec to account for the maximum expected Dt. The increase in CP comes at the expense of a higher overhead to cast a symbol vote (5.2 msec versus 4 m sec). Note that the increased CP duration is adopted only for vote casting and is not part of the normal OFDM operation for data transmissions. Alternatively, to maintain compatibility with the current OFDM specifications, we can extend the symbol vote duration to two OFDM symbols, without increasing the CP duration. This solution comes at the expense of doubling the overhead for casting a symbol vote. A similar solution was adopted in [9] . The two solutions are shown in Fig. 7. 
PHYVOS Implementation
Testbed Setup. We implemented PHYVOS on NI USRPs 2921 devices, operating in the 2.4 GHz band over a 39.6 MHz spectrum. A total of four radios were at our disposal. Under normal operation, three radios operated as voters, whereas one radio operated as the tallier. One radio was switched to an attacker role for adversarial scenarios. Voter radios were placed in a LoS configuration at varying distances from the tallier within an office environment. We divided the 39.6 MHz spectrum to 64 subcarriers. To cast a symbol vote, each radio used BPSK modulation to transmit a random symbol at the designated subcarrier. The CP value was set to 0.8 msec, as the time synchronization error between the different radios was relatively small. We used a 64-point FFT to collect the symbol votes from each subcarrier. The transmission power of each radio was set to 20 dBm (0.1 W).
Selection of Threshold g D . In the first experiment, we investigated the selection of the power threshold g D used in Eq. (4) for detecting votes. We assigned the 1st, 5th, and 9th subcarrier to each of the three voter radios. Each voter casted 1,000 symbol votes at its designated subcarrier by transmitting 1,000 BPSK symbols. The rest of the subcarriers remained null. A time gap of 100 msec was imposed between two consecutive votes. Fig. 8a shows the normalized magnitude of the FFT output at the tallier, averaged over the 1,000 transmitted symbols when the three voters are placed 5ft away from the tallier (topology A). Fig. 8b shows the same results when the three voters are at 5ft, 10ft, and 15ft away from the tallier (topology B).
Figs. 8c and 8d show the received power as a function of time for 100 consecutive symbols. For topology A, the power of active subcarriers is approximately À42 dBm, whereas the power of null subcarriers is À90 dBm. The recorded À90 dBm value for the null subcarriers is well above the noise floor due to the operation of nearby devices over the ISM band. For topology B, the received power from the farthest radio dropped to À49 dBm. Based on the recorded values, we set the threshold g D for the detection of a symbol vote to À80 dBm, which is well above the receiver sensitivity.
Time Synchronization. In the second experiment, we studied the effect of time synchronization on the correct operation of PHYVOS. The experimental setup is shown in Fig. 9a . We used one USRP as the FC, while three USRPs were setup as voting participants. We set the CP value to 2:0msec, the FFT window to 1:2msec, and varied the time synchronization error between the participants. This was achieved by adjusting the firing times of the USRP devices for symbol transmissions, while the USRPs were placed at different distances from the FC. The three participants u 1 ; u 2 ; u 3 were placed as follows: u 1 was placed at 15ft from the FC with a LoS channel, u 2 was placed at 10ft from the FC with a LoS channel, whereas u 3 was placed at 5ft from the FC, but with an obstruction on the LoS path. This created different profiles of synchronization offset for different users due to multipath and also clock errors. For each synchronization offset ðDtÞ, we transmitted 10 6 votes. Further, we performed the experiment for two subcarrier allocations. In the first allocation, the USRP devices were assigned non-adjacent subcarriers, (1, 2), (9, 10) , and (15, 16) for submitting yes/no votes. In the second allocation, USRPs were assigned adjacent subcarriers (1, 2), (3, 4) , and (5, 6). In Fig. 9b , we show the fraction of erroneously received votes as a function of the maximum synchronization error Dt between any two devices. We note that as long as the CP duration is larger than Dt, votes are correctly inferred despite the symbol misalignment. The scenario with non-adjacent subcarriers achieves slightly better performance, as the sample misalignment does not impact adjacent votes.
We repeated the above experiment for the topology of Fig. 9c , where u 3 was placed on the outside of the room that housed the FC, thus obstructing the LoS path. In Fig. 9d , we show the fraction of lost votes as a function of Dt. We observed similar results to the performance under the topology of Fig. 9a , indicating that the use of a longer CP alleviates the misynchronization phenomenon even for NLoS channels.
Voting in the Presence of an Internal Adversary. In the third experiment, we implemented Strategy 1 for an internal adversarial. One of the three USRPs was assigned the role of an internal attacker that is aware of the subcarrier assignment to other voters. Voter #1 was assigned the 1st and 2nd subcarrier while voter #2 was assigned the 5th and 6th subcarrier. For each symbol vote, the attacker randomly selected one subcarrier per voter and injected a random symbol in order to nullify or flip the casted vote (Strategy 1). The experiment lasted for 10 6 symbol votes. Fig. 10a shows the probability of tallying the correct vote vðiÞ, having an inconclusive vote e, or flipping the vote to comp(vðiÞ), as a function of the security parameter ' for topologies A and B. The theoretical values for tallying We observe that the experimental values are in close agreement with the theoretical ones. As expected, the probability of tallying the correct vote rapidly converges to one with the increase of ', whereas the probability of an inconclusive vote becomes small (zero for ' > 8). In our experiments, some votes were actually flipped indicating a drop in the received power on a designated subcarrier to a value smaller than g D for ' consecutive symbol votes. However, this occurred with very low probability and was not observed at all when ' > 2. The results were similar for topology B (see Fig. 10b ), with a slight increase in the probability of flipping a vote. This was primarily observed due to the near-far effect for the most distant voter (placed at 15ft from the tallier).
Simulated Experiments
The USRP experiments involved a small number of devices and were primarily used to study the implementation nuances of simultaneous vote casting. In this section, we perform simulated voting experiments with a large number of participants.
Simulation Setup. We simulated PHYVOS using MATLAB R2015B [22] . We initially considered 26 participants casting votes over 52 subcarriers to a FC. We repeated some experiments for 100 participants. The wireless channel between the tallier and each participant was simulated by a Rician fading model with maximum path delay 1:5 Â 10 À6 sec, a K-factor equal to two, and a LoS SNR equal to 15 dB. The Rician channel was selected because it is representative in many onehop topologies. To cast a symbol vote, participants randomly selected a QPSK symbol. The symbol vote detection threshold g D was set to À80 dBm. A plurality vote criterion (g ¼ 0) was applied to compute the voting outcome.
Vote Nullification Due to Channel Imperfections. In the first set of experiments, we measured the probability of unintentional vote nullification due to wireless channel imperfections. In the absence of an adversary, we varied the SNR of the participant-tallier channel and measured the number of nullified votes at the tallier. Each vote consisted of three symbol votes. Fig. 11a shows the CDF of the nullified votes for different SNRs. We observe that even at low SNR values ( 10 dB), less than four out of the 26 votes are nullified due to fading, with probability over 95 percent.
We also measured the number of unintentionally nullified votes due to CFO and time offsets. These effects are discussed in Sections 7.1 and 7.2. Each participant was randomly assigned a CFO of either 0 KHz or CFO max . We opted to combine participants with and without CFO to allow the maximum frequency misalignment between certain subcarriers at the tallier. Fig. 11b shows the CDF of the nullified votes for various CFO max . For typical CFO values, less than two out of 26 votes are nullified in 95 percent of the observed runs. Vote nullification occurs when a sufficient amount of energy is leaked to adjacent subcarriers due to the CFO. The effect of the CFO can be mitigated if the tallier compensates for it before vote tallying. The tallier can record the CFO of each participant using the preambles of prior packet transmissions. Note that CFO estimation must be repeated infrequently, as it varies very slowly with time.
Furthermore, we simulated the impact of time synchronization errors caused by the misalignment of symbol votes due to time offsets ðDtÞ. Each participant was assigned a time offset of either 0 msec or Dt max msec at random. The tallier used the two symbol vote estimation technique outlined in Section 7.2 to compensate for the symbol time misalignment. Fig. 11c shows the CDF of the nullified votes for varying Dt max . We observe that two symbols for the symbol vote estimation eliminates the impact of misalignment.
In Fig. 11d , we show the CDF of the nullified votes when fading, CFO, and time misalignment are all present in the same experiment. We observe that under typical values (SNR = 15 dB, CFO = 25 kHz and Dt = 1 msec), less than one votes are nullified, on average, with probability over 95 percent. In worse conditions (SNR = 5dB, CFO = 100kHz and Dt = 1.5 m sec), less than six votes are nullified with probability over 95 percent. This CDF shift is primarily due to the low SNR. We use Fig. 11d to set the threshold g null to six votes. Recall that g null is used to detect the presence of an adversary if an unusual number of votes are nullified at the tallier.
Finally, we performed a simulated experiment to evaluate the effects of various channel models on vote correctness. We measured the number of erroneously received votes at the FC for an AWGN channel, a Rayleigh channel with a maximum path delay of 1:5 msec, a Rician channel with a K factor of 2, and a maximum path delay of 1:5 msec and a Nakagami-m channel with fading factors 0.5 and 10. A total of 10 6 votes per participant were transmitted. In Fig. 12 , we show the fraction of erroneous votes received at the FC as a function of the transmit power in dBm. It can be observed that the vote error remains below 10 À5 for all transmit powers and it drops with the power increase. The Nakagami-m channel with a fading factor of 0.5 yields the worst performance, but the error is still quite low and does not significantly affect the energy-based vote detection.
Effect of Varying Participant Distances. In this scenario, we placed two participants at different distances from the tallier in order to vary the received power ratio between subcarriers at the tallier. We considered the subcarrier assignments shown in Fig. 13a . Votes of type A represent cases where two participants inject energy on subcarriers separated by a single subcarrier, votes of type B represent cases where the subcarrier separation is equal to two, whereas votes of type C represent cases where the two participants inject energy on adjacent subcarriers. Fig. 13b shows the probability of vote nullification for any of the two participants as a function of the power of the more distant participant, normalized over the power of the closest participant. The probability of vote nullification remains low even when the power of the distant participant is half of the power of the closest one. Votes of type A have the highest probability of being nullified, because energy from two active subcarriers "bleeds" into a common adjacent empty subcarrier. On the other hand, votes of type B and C exhibit the same probability of vote nullification, because only one active subcarrier "bleeds" into an inactive one. As the transmission powers between the participants become equal, the probability of vote flipping attains very low values.
External Adversary. In the third set of experiments, we evaluated the robustness of PHYVOS against an external adversary. The adversary attempted to flip the voting outcome by injected energy to J randomly selected subcarriers. The tallier used the threshold g null to detect an ongoing attack, if a large number of votes are nullified. We also fixed the number of symbol votes to ' ¼ 3 and the voting margin to m ¼ 3. Fig. 14a shows the tradeoff between probability of flipping T and rejecting the voting round as a function of J. As J increases, the probability of flipping the voting outcome improves for the adversary until J equals 3/4 of the available subcarriers. Any further increase of J has a negative effect. This is because the adversary nullifies votes that oppose the voting outcome. On the other hand, the probability of rejecting the voting round strictly increases with J. For the value of J that maximizes the probability of flipping the voting outcome (Pr½T 6 ¼ T ¼ 0:1; for J ¼ 3N 4 ), the voting round is rejected with probability 94.2 percent.
To verify that PHYVOS is scalable, we repeated the simulated experiments for 100 participants who casted votes over 52 subcarriers. As there are only 52 subcarriers available, the participants were divided to three groups of size 26 and one group of size 22. Participants of the same group casted their votes simultaneously using ' symbol votes, requiring a total of 4' symbols to complete a voting round. Fig. 14b shows the tradeoff between probability of flipping T and rejecting the voting round as a function of J. We observe that the increased number of participants does not qualitatively affect the robustness of PHYVOS.
Internal Adversary. In the fourth set of experiments, we evaluated the robustness of PHYVOS against an internal adversary when applying Strategy 1. Using his knowledge of the subcarrier assignment, the adversary injected energy at one of the two subcarriers assigned per participant. In Fig. 14c , we show the probability of flipping the voting outcome as a function of number of symbol votes ', and for m ¼ f2; 4; 6g. Solid lines indicate the values obtained via simulation, whereas dotted lines show the theoretical values calculated using (13) . For the simulation results, we also plot the upper bound of the 95 percent confidence intervals (the lower bounds are omitted due to the log scale on the Y axis). The simulation results verify the theoretical analysis for the probability of flipping the voting outcome. Using larger values of ' allows the tallier to substantially reduce this probability. We repeated our experiments for 100 participants who casted their votes in groups. Fig. 14d shows similar results to Fig. 14c . This is expected, as only 26 participants vote at every slot.
RELATED WORK
The use of voting for improving reliability has been studied since the 1950s [31] , with a long literature on various reliability and efficiency aspects (e.g., [4] , [5] , [14] , [16] , [17] , [32] ). Levitin proposed a weighted mechanism for binary voting where each vote is weighted based on the participant's identity [16] . The author showed that for participants with different decision times, a tradeoff exists between reliability and delay. He proposed an algorithm to maximize reliability under a time constraint. Barbara and Molina studied the reliability of voting mechanisms, when participants are divided into groups and are assigned a number of votes [4] . The group with the voting majority is prioritized to perform critical system operations. They proposed several vote assignment heuristics to improve the overall system reliability. Kwiat et al. examined three binary voting rules for fault tolerance and evaluated the resulting reliability and security [14] . They proposed a random selection algorithm for computing the voting outcome from a set of votes that contain malicious ones. We emphasize that PHYVOS implements a PHY layer vote casting mechanism that guarantees vote integrity. The voting rules (majority, random selection, number of votes per participant, vote weights, etc.), which is the subject of most previous studies in reliability and fault-tolerance, is complementary to our method.
In the context of wireless networks, voting finds wide application to data fusion, intrusion detection and secure localization in WSNs [2] , [13] , [15] , [34] , real-time coordination in multi-agent systems [8] , and fault-tolerant protocols [20] , [23] . The de facto voting mechanism adopted in these works is message-based voting, in which votes are casted through messaging. Message-based voting also facilities the integration of security measures for preventing the manipulation of the voting outcome. Voters can be authenticated, and vote integrity can be verified using standard cryptographic primitives such as digital signatures, message authentication codes, and digital certificates [30] . Compared to message-based voting, PHYVOS requires significantly less communication overhead, without sacrificing robustness to vote manipulation.
From an implementation standpoint, the most relevant works to ours are presented in [9] , [27] . In [9] , Dutta et al. proposed SMACK, an acknowledgment scheme for implementing a reliable broadcast service. Similar to PHYVOS, SMACK exploits the subcarrier orthogonality of OFDM to allow the simultaneous submission of acknowledgements in response to a broadcast message transmitted by a single source. In [27] , Rahul et al. proposed SourceSync, a distributed wireless architecture that explores sender diversity in OFDM.
SourceSync enables the reception and demodulation of OFDM symbols composed of symbol transmissions over individual subcarriers by a diverse set of senders. Contrary to SMACK and PHYVOS, SourceSync can demodulate the combined OFDM symbol and retrieve the individual data streams of each sender. This capability comes at the expense of complex symbol-level synchronization and channel estimation at the senders, performed through the transmission of preambles.
Recently, the infeasibility of erasing energy from a wireless channel was challenged. P€ opper et al. showed that under stable and predictable channel conditions (e.g., LOS), an attacker utilizing a pair of directional antennas for relaying the inverse of the received signal could cancel a signal at a targeted receiver [24] . Such powerful signal cancellation attacks are hard to launch in practice against PHYVOS due to the multiple wireless channels used by the participants for the simultaneous communication with the tallier. Moreover, channel estimation of any of those channel within the channel coherence time becomes difficult without the transmission of preambles.
CONCLUSION
We presented PHYVOS, a secure and fast PHY-layer voting scheme for wireless networks. In PHYVOS, no explicit messaging is necessary. Participants cast their votes simultaneously by exploiting the subcarrier orthogonality in OFDM. PHYVOS is aimed at reducing the delay overhead for wireless applications where secure voting is time-critical. We analyzed the robustness of PHYVOS against both external and internal adversaries who aim at altering the voting outcome at the tallier. We showed that PHYVOS maintains the integrity of the voting outcome with high probability, without using cryptographic primitives. We extended PHYVOS to a decentralized operation scenario, in which participants can determine the voting outcome without the presence of a centralized tallier. We implemented PHYVOS on the USRP platform and verified the robustness properties via experimentation and simulations.
